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LAND DAMAGE LIABILITY IN AIRCRAFT CASES
By
PROFESSOR JOHN AUGUSTINE EUBANK*

Frequently, when the courts are about to decide a suit brought against an
aircraft owner, lessee or operator for damages to persons and property on the surface resulting from the flight, ascent or descent of the aircraft or the dropping
of objects therefrom, students of the law are alert to learn if the courts apply or
reject the liability-without-fault rule in deciding for or against the groundsmen.
(Of course this has no reference to suits wherein there is evidence of negligence
on the part of the aircraft or contributory negligence of the landsmen, because
in those actions, generally there is no particular problem.)
In some instances the courts have circumvented the liability-without-fault
rule or have disregarded the rule by basing their decisions on trespass. In Rochester
Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop1 in which the defendant's aircraft crashed into
and damaged a steel tower supporting wires, it was ruled that the defendant was
liable in trespass as a matter of law. The court said:
"If, on the other hand, common experience requir'es the opposite conclusion, namely, that no matter how perfectly constructed or how carefully managed an aeroplane may be, it may still fall, then the man who
takes it over another's land and kills his cow or knocks off his chimney,
has committed an inexcusable trespass. It must be kept in mind that when
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damage occurs in such a case, one or the other party has to stand it, and
no reason readily suggests itself why it should not be the one who has
brought about the chance occurrence.
Although the basis of this decision was trespass, the reasoning closely leans
to the liability-without-fault rule. In the over a century old case of Guille v. Swan,2
wherein the defendant's balloon descended into plaintiff's garden and attracted
a crowd of people who in their desire to help the aeronaut or out of curiosity
overran the property with the result that plaintiff's garden was damaged. It was
held that defendant was liable as a trespasser. In the case, Portsmouth Land and
Hotel Co. v. U. S.,8 the United States was held liable to the groundsman for having fired shots across its property. Damages were awarded to a person who while
walking on the highway was injured by a falling balloon. Canney v. Rochester
Agriculture Association.4
In the recent case of- Gaidys v. U. S.,5 a U. S. Army jet plane crashed into
plaintiff's house. The court held that in the present stage of development of jet
airplanes, the take-off and landing of such a craft in a residential area is an extra
hazardous activity. Therefore, such an act was a wrongful act and a trespass on
plaintiff's property. It also constituted a breach of a privileged passage through
plaintiff's airspace for the reason that said flight endangered and damaged the
land and the structures, property and persons thereon. It was therefore a trespass
by the defendant for which the plaintiff should recover. This case was appealed,
and on February 21, 1952, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, affirmed the decision of the United States District Court of Colorado.
The appellate court made the significant statement that if the plane had been
flying at a safe altitude, perhaps questions more difficult of solution would have
been presented. In this case the aircraft was flying low, only 100 feet in the nonnavigable airspace and fell on plaintiff's house. From this statement of the court,
it can reasonably be inferred that if immediately before the crash occurred, the
aircraft had been flying above 1000 feet in the navigable airspace as prescribed
by Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act and Section L(24) of the Civil Aeronautics
Act and regulations thereunder, the solution of the problem confronting the court
would have been determined on one of the following grounds:
(1)

Liability-without-fault.

(2) Liability based on evidence of negligence and freedom from
contributory negligence upon the party aggrieved.
(3) Evidence that the use of the airplane was an extra-hazardous
undertaking.
2 19 Johnson 381 (N.Y., 1822).
2 260 U.S. 327.
4 76 N.H. 603, U.S. Aviation Reports, 105 (1928). See also Sollak v. State of New York, U. S,
Av. Rep. 42 (1929); cattle frightened by plane, U.S. Av. Rep. 46 (1928); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 311; King v. U.S., U.S. Av. Rep. 73 (1950); Webb v. Sessler, U.
S. Av. Rep. 271 (1951); Evans v. U.S., U.S. Av. Rep. 496 (1951).
5 U.S. Av. Rep. 352 (1951).
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(4) No liability if there was evidence that the accident was due
to an Act of God or unavoidable causes.
A Maryland statute provides for a presumption of negligence. In D'Anna v.
U. S.,6 C. C. A., 4th Circuit, April 11, 1950, wherein a U. S. Army plane fell into
a fruit market stand injuring persons and damaging property, it was held that the
United States did not meet the presumption and was liable. In speaking of the
common law the court stated:
"At common law, the hazardous nature of the enterprise subjected the operator of the plane to a rule of absolute liability to one upon
the ground who was injured or whose property was damaged as the
result of the operation. Restatement of Torts Sections 519, 520 (d), Prosser on Torts, p. 452. The Maryland act has modified this rule to the extent that the owner or operator of the plane may exculpate himself by
showing the injury was not caused by negligence on his part."
Thus, the consideration of liability of aircraft operators for damages (possibly
other than that caused by the mere passage of aircraft in trespass and nuisance
cases) to persons and property on the surface, wherein the damages are thL result of negligence of the aircraft operator and the party aggrieved is free from
contributory negligence, is, of course, quickly disposed of through the application
of the common law rules of negligence applicable to torts on the land.
When damages occur which are not the result of negligence of the aircraft
operator and the party injured has not contributed to the injury, the question
arises whether or not liability should be imposed on the aircraft operator, his lessee,
agent or servant. The problem is one which has given students of aeronautical
law much concern, and over which there has risen a division of viewpoint among
authorities of that branch of jurisprudence. From doctrinaire, statutory enactment,
adjudicated cases with some support from the common law there has developed
a rule of absolute liability. Under this rule an aircraft operator, his agents, servants
or lessees are absolutely liable for damages caused by such aircraft to persons
and property on the ground, irrespective of whether or not the damage is the
result of the negligence of the aircraft. Of course, the injured party must be
free from contributory negligence. This absolute liability doctrine has been sharply
7
challenged.
Nevertheless, the rule is part of the statutory law of a number of states and
is embodied in the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, Section 5, which reads
as follows:
"Section 5. Damage On Land. The owner of every aircraft
which is operated over the lands or waters of this State is absolutely
liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath,
caused by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping
6 U.S. Av. Rep. 282 (1950).
7 Eubank, Unfair Damage Liability Imposed on Aircraft, Pacific Aviation (February, 1929).
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or falling of any objects therefrom, whether such owner was negligent
or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the nee i ence
of the person injured, or of the owner or bailee of the property injured.
If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person or property,
both owner and lessee shall be liable, and they may be sued jointly,
or either or both of them may be sued separately. An aeronaut who is
not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the consequence of his
own negligence. The in)ured person, or owner or bailee of the injured
property, shall have a lien on the aircraft causing the injury to the extent of the damage caused by the aircraft or objects falling from it."
Section 5 would apply when damages occur while the aircraft is rolling on
the ground with its motor running both in the take-off and in landing bcause such
transitional movements are part of the flight contemplated in the terms "ascent"
and "descent" mentioned in the section. However, Section 5 would not apply
while an aircraft was taking-off and landing on an airdrome. 8
This section is a decidedly far-reaching example of legislative enactment
imposing absolute liability in the absence of negligence. Section 5 has been incorporated into the statutory laws of a number of the states in the union. However, of the twenty-two jurisdictions (twenty-one states and the Territory of
Hawaii) which have adopted the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, not all have
seen fit to include therein the provisions of the absolute liability rule. Furthermore, some of the states which originally enacted Section 5 in toto have repealed
the liability-without-fault provision and have substituted provisions which either
provide for the application of the (1) rules of law applicable to torts on the land,
(2) liability only on proof of negligence, (3) a rule of prima facie negligence or
(4) some modification or limitation of the general rule applicable to torts in
general. Idaho, Nevada and Maryland are three such examples. While Pennsylvania
and Missouri have largely adopted the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics (otherwise known as the Uniform Aeronautics Act) or have incorporated most of its
provisions in their own codes, neither of them have included the absolute liability
rule. Moreover, Montana only has a provision of liability of aircraft without fault
when the damages result from forced landing.
After taking different stands in the matter, Pennsylvania finally adopted the
law applicable to torts on the land and Missouri deals only with liability for damages occurred in collision between aircraft, being silent as to damages to the
groundsman in other cases. This renouncement or absence of the rule of absolute
liability by a number of jurisdictions is convincing evidence of its severity.
Some of the sovereignties which have adopted the Uniform State Laws for
Aeronautics, and which have accepted Section 5 en masse, thereby adopting the rule
of liability without fault, are Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Minnesota, Tennessee, North Dakota and the Territory of Hawaii.
8 Birckhead v. Sammon, 171 Md. 178. See § 20, British Navigation and Art. 2 (3) of the Rome
Convention.
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After having adopted the liability-without-fault rule, Maryland repudiated
such rule and now provides for a rule of prima facie negligence.9 Nevada did likewise in 1947. In Rhode Island, South Carolina and Wisconsin, the liability-without-fault rule has limited application. In the main, however, the rule is retained.
By Chapter 1435 of the Laws of 1929 of Rhode Island, the owner or lessee of
an aircraft is liable only for the consequence of his own negligence if the aircraft is under the control of a lessee. In both South Carolina and Wisconsin in
their Laws of 1929, the owner and lessee are jointly liable but an aeronaut who
is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only to the extent of his own negligence.
Wyoming has a provision of law making the aircraft liable absolutely for damages
resulting from forced landings only and is also silent as to other type of cases.
Connecticut has never adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act, and after some
different stands on the question finally adopted the rule of liability only on proof
of negligence, but subsequently repealed such final act in 1933. Back in 1911,
Connecticut enacted the absolute liability rule.'1 Although that law imposed absolute liability, it was silent on the proposition of liability for damages in the absence of negligence, in that no affirmative statement to that effect was embodied
in the statute.' 2 Seven years later the state in Chapter 176, Laws of 1918, affirmatively stated that an aeronaut was absolutely liable for damages to persons
or property, whether caused by negligence or due to an unavoidable accident. In
1931, however, the state reversed its previous position.' 8 By the latter enactment

it was provided that every pilot shall be responsible for damages caused to persons
or property suffered by any person from injuries by an aircraft directed by or under the control of such pilot but only when the injury is the result of negligence on
the part of the pilot. Again in 1927,14 Connecticut re-enacted substantially the
same Law of 1921 which imposed liability only in the event of negligence. This
law known as Section 3077 of the General Statute was re-enacted by Section 32
of Chapter 253 of the Laws of 1929 but was repealed by Chapter 146 of the
Laws of 1933.

Over thirty-nine years ago, in 1913, Massachusetts 15 created a presumption of liability on aircraft from the mere occurrence of an accident. Later in
191916 the state repealed the 1913 law, and today the laws of that commonwealth
are silent on the proposition.
In addition to Massachusetts, Montana and Missouri, there are some twentyfour states which are also silent as to the liability of aircraft for damages to persons
and property on the surface where there is no negligence on the part of the air9 Md. Laws, 1937.
11 § 11, ch. 86, Laws of 1911.

12 Eubank, Legal Handicap for Aircraft, Airway Age (February, 1929).
18 § 13 ch. 207, Laws of 1921.
14 § 26, ch. 324, Laws of 1927.
15 Ch. 663, Laws of 1913.

16 Ch. 306, Laws of 1919.
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craft. Those states are Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Oklahoma, Alaska, Texas,
New Mexico, Oregon and California.
Georgia in 1933 enacted a law providing that proof of injury inflicted to
persons or property on the ground by the operator of an aircraft, shall be prima
facie evidence of negligence on the part of operator of such aircraft in reference
to such injury. Minnesota in 1943 reaffirmed the liability-without-fault rule reenacting the identical provisions of Section 5 of the Uniform State Laws for Aeronautics.17 Vermont re-enacted the rule as recently as 1951.
To summarize, twelve jurisdictions have adopted the absolute liability rule
without any restriction or limitation through statutory enactment of Section 5 of
the Uniform State Laws for Aeronautics. Three states, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and Wisconsin, have adopted Section 5 with some limitation on the rule. Two
other states, Montana and Wyoming have laws giving the liability-without-fault
rule a very restricted application, viz., to damages resulting from forced landings
only and without any consideration to the other type of cases. Three states, Georgia,
Nevada and Maryland, have adopted the presumption of negligence rule through
the declaration that the mere happening of an accident shall spell out a prima
facie case of negligence against the airman. Arizona permits liability only on proof
of negligence. Two other sovereignties, Pennsylvania and Idaho, have laws affirmatively stating that the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to torts on
the land shall be invoked. The balance of the twenty-five states of the union have
refrained from any statutory declaration on the question or have retreated from
previous positions. Connecticut is a striking example. Of course, some of the
jurisdictions have spoken through judicial action of the courts. It is apparent that
a number of states have been progressive enough to enact laws in an honest attempt to solve the problem. Unless the states which have not finally spoken on the
subject or have not expressed themselves through judicial decisions can be accused of passive indifference, they are either opposed to the absolute liability theory
or are reluctant to express approval thereof. The absence of uniformity with reference to damage liability of aircraft to persons and property on the surface is
one of the compelling evidences of the necessity and wisdom of uniform aeronautical
l'egislation' 8 and aeronautical laws in general.
In the 79th Congress, First Session, a bill (H. R. 532 introduced by Representative O'Hara) was sponsored which provided for the liability-without-fault
rule with respect to damage liability of aircraft for damages to persons and prop17 § 20 (4), Minnesota Laws of 1943.
18 Eubank, Uniform Air Laws Are Imperative, Airway Age (December, 1929).
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erty on the surface with a limitation of the liability as to the amount of recovery.
The measure also had a provision that liability would exist only upon proof of
negligence when the injury, death,.or damage was caused within the area of an airport available for the storage, handling, loading, unloading, taxying, take-off, ,t
landing of aircraft.
This latter feature of the bill is consistent with the decision in Birckhead v.
Sammon, 19 in which it was ruled that the liability-without-fault rule as provided
for in Section 5 of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics had reference only to
injuries to persons or property where the descent of the aircraft would be a trespass
upon the rights of the land owner. And certainly the liability-without-fault rule as
provided for in said Section 5 was never intended to apply to the authorized
landing of an airplane at an airport.
Since the Birckhead v. Sammon decision, Maryland has adopted the prima
facie rule of negligence formula through enactment in the year 1937 of the
following law:
"Damages on land-prima facie liability of aircraft owner. The
owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of
this state is prima facie liable for injuries to persons or property on the
land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of the owner or bai ee of the property injured, or unless at
the time of such injury the said aircraft is being used without the consent,
express or implied, of the owner. If the aircraft is leased at the time of
injury to person or property both owner and lessee shall be prima facie
liable, and they may be sued jointly, or either or both of them may
be sued jointly, or either or both of them may be sued separately. The
presumption of liability on the part of the owner, or of the owner and
lessee, as the case may be, may be rebutted by proof that the injury
was not caused by negligence on the part of such owner or lessee, or
of any person operating such aircraft with the permission of the owner
or lessee, or of any person maintaining or repairing such aircraft with
the permission of the owner or lessee. An aeronaut who is not the
owner or lessee shall be liable only for the consequences of his own
negligence."
In the proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act as formulated by the American
Law Institute in May, 1937, there is embodied therein an adoption of the liabilitywithout-fault rule with respect to the liability of aircraft for damages to persons
and property on the surface. Section 2 of the 1937 Tentative Draft of such act
provided in part as follows:
"Liability for injuries to individuals and property on the land. For
injuries within this state to individuals or propert on the land, the
owner of any aircraft, except a public aircraft, shallbe liable, regardless
19 171

Md. 178.
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of nesligence, to those, or to the personal representatives of those, injured m person or property, by the ascent or descent or attempt to ascend
or flight or other movement of an aircraft, or by the falling or dropping
of any object therefrom, unless the injury was caused by the wilful misconduct of the party injured in person or property."
This section also provided for fixed amounts, limiting liability.
The severity of the liability-without-fault rule might be somewhat alleviated
by not having it made applicable when damages result from an Act of God or
i4s major. In some quarters there has been a trend in that direction. Further, there
has been a tendency to give application to the rule only to persons in whose
economic advantage largely the aircraft is being operated. Consequently, if a pilot
is not the owner of the aircraft he is not liable unless the damage is the result of
his negligence. This is in accordance with Section 5 of the Uniform State Laws for
Aeronautics.
The Civil Aeronautics Board in excerpts from a study of proposed aviation
liability legislation, dated June, 1941, made the following statement with reference to damage liability of aircraft to persons and property on the surface:
"Persons on the ground (not on a landing area of an established
airport) should be compensated for injuries directly attributable to the
operation of aircraft, irrespective of the aircraft operators' negligence. It
is believed that the imposition of this liability by legislation involves no
departure from law as it is now developing, and that it would have the
desired effect of eliminating the confusion in legal theories prevailing
in the decisions of the courts that have considered this liability. Important as the continued development of civil aviation is believed to be,
no convincing reason has been presented why it should be subsidized
at the expense of the luckless victim on the ground who, without participating in aviation in any way, is injured by an aircraft accident not attributable to the fault of the operator."
Historically, it is of interest that the liability-without-fault rule or the absolute liability formula has a historic basis as far back as 2000 B.C. In the Hammurabi Code of 4000 years ago there is evidence of principles of law having some
similarity to the liability-without-fault rule. The principle of retaliation and the
concept of the "an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth" were manifested in the
code. Further evidence of these principles is found in the Twelve Tables of Rome.
Through changes in form but fundamentally not in principle, the absolute liability
rule became the law of later centuries and the civil law of the modem era.
Global Acceptance of the Liability-Without-FaultRule
Nearly all of the nations of continental Europe have or had the absolute liability rule in force. The European nations or former nations which have or had
adopted the rule are Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Hungary, Germany,
Austria, Italy, Danzig, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Czechslovakia, Denmark, France,
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Russia and Norway. Also Algeria, Chile, Salvador ,Irish Free State and Venezuela
have accepted the doctrine of liability-without-fault. In this connection it must be
borne in mind that the laws of many foreign nations permit one to contract against
his own negligence.
Great Britain in the British Air Navigation Act of 1920 includes the rule
therein in the following language:
". .. where material damage or loss is caused by an aircraft in
flight, taking off, or landing, or by any person in any such aircraft, to
any person or property on land, or water, damage shall be recoverable
from the owner of the aircraft in respect of such damage or loss, without
proof of negligence or intention or other cause of action, as though the
same had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or default, except where
the damage or loss was caused by or contributed to by the negligence
of the person by whom the same was suffered..."
In justification for imposing on aircraft the burden of absolute liability, the
British Aerial Transport Committee wrote in their report in 1918, and which rcport was in part at least the basis for the British Air Navigation Act of 1920,
as follows:
"Admittedly persons on land are practically powerless to ensure
their own safety by precautionary measures against damage caused by
the fall of aircraft or objects carried therein. It is a matter of some doubt
whether under existing principles of law persons suffering from such
damage would be called on to prove an affirmative case of negligence
or intentional trespass. It is possible that the courts might hold aircraft
to be within the class of those things which the owner keeps or uses
at his peril.We think it preferable that the principles applicable should
be defined by legislation rather than that they should be left for solution by a series of judicial decisions; we think, too, that as far as
damage done by aircraft is concerned the deprivation of the land owner
of what is almost certainly an existing right of property should be compensated by what will be in effect an insurance on himself and his propperty against such damage. Nor do we think that in practice the expense of insuring himself against third parties risk will prove very
burdensome to the owner of the aircraft."
Irrespective of the merits of the liability-without-fault doctrine, one cannot
subscribe to the statement that bceause the landowner has been deprived of certain
of his rights in airspace, concessions should be made to him in connection with
damage resulting other than by the mere passage of aircraft over the subjacent
owner's property. If the liability-without-fault doctrine is the correct one, it should
be imposed, if not, the contrary should hold, concessions or no concessions.
Since when have fundamental property rights in terms of well established
principles of jurisprudence become the subject of barter in determining legal
precepts? The British Air Navigation Act of 1936 also adopts the liability-with-
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out-fault rule but with a limitation of liability.2 0 The Air Code of the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republics (U. S. S. R.) approved by the Central Executive Committee of the U. S. S. R. on April 27, 1933 in Article 8, Section 53, thereof adopted
the liability-without-fault rule. The section read as follows:
"In conformity with the general legislation of the U. S. S. R. and
the federated republics, the air transport company is liable for death and
bodily injuries occurring to passengers and to members of the personnel
of civil aircraft during the take-off, flight and landing, and for damages to third persons and property, in all cases where it is not proved that
the damage has been the result of wilful or gross negligence on the
part of the victim."
The Havana Convention provides that reparations for damages caused to persons or property located in the subjacent territory shall be governed by the laws
2
of each state. '
The Rome Convention signed at Rome, Italy in 1933, a multilateral international agreement in the field of private international law, adopts the
liability-without-fault rule with a limitation of liability. 22 Forty-three nations
including the United States signed the convention agreement but only five
nations (Belgium, Spain, Guatemala, Brazil and Rumania) have ratified it.
Through these five ratifications it became effective February 11, 1942. There
has been considerable opposition to this convention, particularly because of the
liability-without-fault rule embodied therein. Back in 1933, the Committee on
Aeronautical Law of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and
28
Connecticut, adopted a resolution opposing the rule.
Since 1933 there have been two draft revisions of the Rome Convention, one
a tentative draft adopted in Mexico City in 1951 and a final draft adopted and
signed in Rome on October 6, 1952, by delegates from thirty-two nations including
the United States. This new and final draft retains the liability-without-fault rule
and increases the maximum amount of liability. The previous small maximum
amounts had been severely critized as being wholly inadequate. 24 The 1952 draft
will become effective upon the ratification of five nations.
20 § 15 (1).
21 Art. 28.
22 Art. 2.

28 American Bar Association Journal 369-370 (June, 1933).
24 Eubank, Aeronautical Jurisprudence, vol. 3, p. 420-421.

